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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
laws of the states. This line of argument might even depend some-
what on whether the function the agency was involved in was
more proprietary than governmental. As an example, it seems that
the Federal Emergency Relief Act would be a much more cen-
tralized governmental function than the Small Business Act. The
law in this area is far from settled although some guidelines are
gradually appearing. This area of law is comparatively recent in
origin, and all that is certain is that this problem can only be
resolved by a creative federal judiciary.
Larry Lynn Skeen
Income Tax-Depreciation In Year Of Sale
The taxpayer acquired a depreciable asset and began using a
straight line depreciation method based on its estimated useful life
and salvage value. He sold the asset before the end of its estimated
useful life for more than its undepreciated cost. The Commissioner
disallowed the usual depreciation deduction for the year of sale,
asserting that in the year of retirement, the usual depreciation
deduction is limited to the amount by which the undepreciated cost
at the beginning of that year exceeded the amount received from
the retirement. Held, reversed. The figure below which usual
depreciation may not be taken is salvage value, an estimate made
when an asset is acquired. The Commissioner may redetermine the
estimated salvage value when he can show it was incorrect, but the
mere event of a sale does not automatically give him the right to
substitute a figure equal to the sales price as the amount below
which no further depreciation may be taken. Macabe Co., 42 T.C.
No. 87 (1964).
An understanding of the nature and function of depreciation
accounting is necessary to appreciate the problem involved in the
principal case. According to generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples, depreciation aims to allocate the cost or other basic value
of an asset, less its estimated salvage value, over its estimated use-
ful life. Depreciation is sharply distinguished from the concept
of a decline in value. American Institute of Accountants, Account-
ing Terminology Bulletin No. 1, if 56 (1953). This same principle
is recognized by economists. Depreciation is not concerned with
changing market values, because it is merely an allocation of so
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much of the original cost as is used in earning income. SAnzts,
DEExECEiATiON PRmNCtPLES AND APPiCATONS 47 (1922). The Su-
preme Court has recognized these principles in interpreting the
deduction Congress has allowed for depreciation. The purpose of
depreciation accounting is to further the integrity of periodic in-
come statements by allocating the cost of an asset over its useful
life. Massey Motors Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960). The
theory underlying the tax deduction for depreciation is that using
up the asset amounts to its gradual sale. United States v. Ludey,
274 U.S. 295 (1927).
When an asset is retired the accountant treats the difference be-
tween the estimated salvage value and the actual amount realized
from the sale as an extraordinary item and not as a current, ordinary
income item. This is consistant with the economic theory that there
are actually two types of events simultaneously affecting the value
of an asset: (1) the depreciation in value because of wear and
tear, and (2) the change in value because of market conditions
such as supply and demand. It is very possible that at the same
time events of the first type are causing the value to decrease,
events of the second type may be causing the value to increase.
However, the fact that these two types of events operate simul-
taneously and produce a net effect does not change the fact that
each type is in operation and should be accounted for separately;
they are not merely different aspects of the same problem. SAnEBs,
op. cit. supra at 47. The Committee on Terminology of the Amer-
ican Institute of Accountants emphasized the inaccuracy of con-
sidering depreciation as a method of equating book value and
market value by pointing out that depreciation concerns cost. Spe-
cifically, it concerns the cost of exhaustion just as wages concern
the cost of labor. American Institute of Accounts, op. cit. supra at
II 56.
The issue in the principal case involves only a part of a much
broader situation arising out of the interaction of (1) the total
amount of the depreciation deductions taken which reduce the
highly taxed ordinary income, and (2) the amount of the receipt
from the retirement of an asset that is classified as capital in nature
and taxed at the low capital gain rate. The first of these is a matter
of reducing the basis on which the tax is computed over a number
of years. The second is a matter of classifying a receipt in the
year of retirement as either capital or ordinary. INT. REv. CODE OF
1965]
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1964, § 167 gives the taxpayer a deduction for depreciation on cer-
tain property for reasonable wear and tear to reduce the taxable
ordinary income. Section 1001 of the CODE and subsequent sections
provide that when the amount realized from the sale of an asset is
greater than the undepreciated cost, the difference shall be taxed
at the lower long term capital gain rate. Since undepreciated cost
is merely the remainder of cost less total amount of depreciation
taken, the amount of the realization that will be classified as capital
rather than ordinary depends directly on the total amount of de-
preciation taken. Section 1231 allows capital treatment on the sale
of much of the same property on which depreciation can be taken
under section 167.
Therefore, in the numerous cases in which the total of the depre-
ciation deductions has exceeded the decline in market value, the
same depreciation deduction that caused a decrease in the amount
of ordinary income to be taxed will also influence the classification
of the receipt from the retirement in favor of classification as capital.
To the extent a deduction for depreciation reduces undepreciated
cost below the amount ultimately realized on the retirement of the
asset, the amount of the taxpayer's ordinary income has been re-
duced, and the receipt from the retirement will be classified as
capital gain. This is commonly referred to as depreciation recap-
ture, a term which seems to add little clarity to the situation. In
fact, this tax treatment corresponds very favorably with the eco-
nomic and accounting theory mentioned above, and apparently
this is what Congress intended.
The principal case is concerned with the depreciation recapture
only to the extent that it occurred because of a depreciation deduc-
tion taken in the year of retirement. The following hypothetical
situations illustrate this interaction and specifically raise the issue
of the principal case.
The taxpayer paid 10,000 dollars for a depreciable asset. Using
an estimated useful life of eight years, an estimated salvage value
of 2,000 dollars, and the straight line depreciation method, he took
yearly depreciation deductions of 1,000 dollars. At the end of the
fourth year an unforeseen event occurred which caused the market
value of the asset to increase, and the taxpayer sold the asset for
6,400 dollars. He qualified for capital gain treatment under section
1231 and will compute his gain, if any, according to section 1001
[Vol. 67
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and subsequent sections. The gain will be the excess of the amount
realized over the undepreciated cost.
(1) Assuming, as does the taxpayer in the principal case, that
the ordinary depreciation deduction for the year of sale is limited
only by the estimated salvage value of 2,000 dollars, the taxpayer
can reduce the undepreciated cost from 7,000 to 6,000 dollars.
Under this assumption, the full depreciation is allowed in the year
of sale. The excess of the realization from the sale over the un-
depreciated cost is then 400 dollars. Therefore 400 dollars of the
6,400 dollars can be classified as capital gain and taxed at the low
capital gain rate rather than the high ordinary income rate.
(2) Assuming, as does the Commissioner in the principal case,
that the ordinary depreciation deduction for the year of sale is lim-
ited by the amount realized from the sale, the taxpayer can reduce
the undepreciated cost from 7,000 dollars only to 6,400 dollars.
In this event there is no excess of realization over undepreciated
cost. Therefore none of the 6,400 dollars can be classified as
capital gain and taxed at the low capital gain rate.
According to generally accepted accounting principles and 26
C.F.R. § 1.167(a)-l(a) (1961), the taxpayer is correct in asserting
that the figure that limits the total amount of depreciation that
may be taken is the estimated salvage value. However, in Rev.
Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 CuM. BuLL. 29, the Commissioner contends that
this figure is the limit only so long as the asset is on hand and that
in the year of sale the limit automatically becomes the actual realiza-
tion from the sale. As can be seen from the second assumption
above, this position would always prevent the ordinary deduction
for the year of sale from having any effect on the classification of
the realization as capital or ordinary.
The Commissioner contends that the ordinary depreciation deduc-
tion in the year of sale may be taken only to the extent the unde-
preciated cost at the beginning of that year exceeded the amount
realized from the sale or exchange. In answer to 26 C.F.R. §
1.167(a)-1(c) (1961), which provides that the estimated salvage
value shall not be changed merely because of changes in price level,
the Commissioner maintains the reason for the rule fails in the
year of sale. He asserts that the regulation is designed to eliminate
needless controversies based on mere estimates of what depreciation
should be and in the year of sale it is not necessary to rely on
1965]
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estimates because the actual realization is then known. To support
his position the Commissioner relies on Cohn v. United States, 259
F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958), in which the court stated that a sale
which shows depreciation to be out of line is more than a mere
fluctuation. It is a final and definite closing of the account, and
no injustice results from denying a deduction known to be fictional at
the time it was taken. The Commissioner further relies on three Su-
preme Court cases to support his position. Massey Motors Inc. v.
United States, supra, in which the case of Evans v. United States
was also decided, and Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122
(1960). In United States v. Motorlease Corp., CCH 1964 STAND.
FED. TAx REP. 19645 (2d Cir. 1964), the second circuit adopted the
Commissioner's position and held that Congress did not design
the depreciation deduction to encourage the "transmutation of
ordinary income into capital gain."
The Commissioner's position does not correspond favorably with
generally accepted economic and accounting theory. The idea that
the depreciation deduction in the year of sale results in an undesir-
able "transmutation of income," that it is fictional when taken,
or that it results in an undesirable recapture completely ignores
the fact that depreciation deals with cost rather than value. All
of these ideas ignore the fact that if market value fails to go down
along with the depreciation of the cost, then a gain has been earned
simply by having held the asset at a particularly favorable time.
In the principal case the Tax Court observed the Commissioner's
failure to distinguish between (1) depreciation through exhaustion,
and (2) changes in value due to market conditions. The court
stated that the Internal Revenue Code deals separately with these
problems and that the distinction is recognized in the regulations.
Where depreciable property is unexpectedly disposed of sub-
stantially before the end of its useful life, the actual realization from
the sale bears little or no relevance to the estimated salvage value.
The court further stated that Congress intended that the cost of
using an asset was to reduce the amount of income taxed at the
high ordinary rate and that the Commissioner's position prevents
this in the year of sale.
The judicial history of the year-of-sale depreciation problem has
been inconsistent:
(1) Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 990 (1947), acq.,
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1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 3, rev'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d 549 (5th
Cir. 1949), was decided in favor of the taxpayer. This Tax Court
decision, in which the Commissioner originally acquiesed, deter-
mined that the ordinary depreciation deduction would not be dis-
allowed merely because the price received on the retirement of the
asset was more than the undepreciated cost of the asset.
(2) In Cohn v. United States, supra, the sixth circuit allowed
the taxpayer to redetermine the useful life of the asset sold and held
that where there was a redetermination of useful life, there could
also be a redetermination of the estimated salvage value. The court
further held that since the redetermination was being made after
the asset had been sold, it was permissable, though not necessary,
to use hindsight and "estimate" the salvage value to be the amount
actually received from the sale. The Cohn case is not authority for
the broad proposition that the mere event of a sale automatically
entitles the Commissioner to re-estimate the useful life to be zero and
estimated salvage value to be the same as the actual sale price.
Merritt, Government Briefs in Cohn Refute IRS Disallowance of
Year-of-Sale Depreciation, 20 J. TAxATIoN 156 (1964).
(3) Massey Motors Inc. v. United States, supra, and Hertz
Corp. v. United States, supra, were decided by the Supreme Court
on the same day. The Commissioner relies on these cases to support
his position; however, they are factually distinguishable from his
broad ruling that in the year of sale the usual depreciation deduc-
tion is limited to the amount by which the undepreciated cost at
the beginning of the year exceeded the amount realized from the
retirement. In each of these cases the taxpayer had failed to make
any estimate for salvage value when he acquired the asset. The
Supreme Court held that salvage value had to be considered as a
part of the depreciation equation and that, where it must be figured
after the asset is sold, hindsight may be used.
(4) In Rev. Rul. 62-92 the Commissioner, relying on the Cohn
case, asserted his position that in the year of sale the ordinary de-
duction for depreciation could be taken only to the extent that the
undepreciated cost exceeded the amount realized from the retire-
ment. In effect this amounts to the substitution, in the year of sale,
of the actual sales price for the estimated salvage value. In what ap-
pears to be clearly beyond the scope of the Cohn case the Commis-
sioner asserts that this substitution is automatic and does not de-
pend on there having been a mistake in the taxpayer's estimates.
19651
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(5) In Randolph D. Rouse, 39 T.C. 70 (1962), and Fribourg
Navigation Co., 21 CCII TAx CT. RimP. 1533 (1962), affd, CCH 1964
STAND. FR. TAx RP. 9644, (2d Cir. 1964), the Tax Court re-
versed the position it had taken in Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co.,
supra, and ruled in favor of the Commissioner. In each case the
taxpayer was denied his ordinary deduction for depreciation in the
year of sale.
(6) Fribourg Navigation Co., supra, on appeal to the second
circuit, was affirmed. The second circuit stated that the Commis-
sioner's position was strongly suggested by the Cohn case although
logically inconsistant. There was a strong dissent claiming that
the majority opinion completely ignored the law. On the same day
the second circuit decided Fribourg Navigation Co., supra, it gave
a similar ruling in Motorlease Corp., supra.
(7) The principal case was then decided by the Tax Court in
favor of the taxpayer. This represented a reversal of the position
the Tax Court had taken in Fribourg Navigation Co. supra, which
had just been affirmed by the second circuit.
(8) Smith Leasing Co., 43 T.C. No. 5 (1964), is a more recent
case but is distinguishable on the facts. The taxpayer failed to bear
the burden of proving that his estimates were correct.
(9) C. L. Nichols, 43 T.C. No. 13 (1964), was recently decided
in favor of the taxpayer. It seems the Tax Court has abandoned
its early concurrence with the Commissioner's interpretation of the
Cohn case. The Tax Court is now following its original position as
expressed in Wier Long Leaf Lumber Co., supra, and reasserted in
the principal case. Merritt, New Cases Clarify Cohn Confusion
on Year-of-Sale Depreciation, 21 J. TAxATioN 324 (1964).
(10) In United States v. S & A Co., 338 F.2d 629 (8th Cir.
1964), the Commissioner's position was rejected and the court held
that the following factors were sufficient to entitle taxpayer to his
usual depreciation deduction: (a) unusual and unanticipated sale
of depreciable asset during its life, (b) reasonableness of taxpay-
er's acquisition estimates of useful life and salvage value, and (c)
the claimed depreciation would have been allowed for the sale
year had the sale not taken place.
With the Tax Court returning to its original position, it appears
only the Commissioner and the second circuit look with favor on
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Rev. Rul. 62-92. However, the number of appeals pending indicates
that the law on this point is not settled. Merritt, op. cit. supra.
Congressional enactment of the Int. Rev. Code of 1962, §§ 1245,
1250, has limited the problem considerably. These sections require
the taxpayer to apply the high ordinary tax rate to certain gains
to the extent depreciation recapture is involved. These sections
look to the much broader problem of the interaction caused by any
deduction for depreciation without regard for the year in which it
was taken. However, they fail to completely dispose of the issue
in the year of sale because (1) they concern only certain property
and (2) section 1250 operates only as to a part of the recapture.
Therefore, the need for dispositive legislation or a Supreme Court
pronouncement remains.
Robert Willis Walker
Procedure-Imputability of Attorney's Negligence to Client Under
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
Appellee was injured by a car driven by an employee of appellant.
Two days before the statute of limitations would have barred his
claim, appellee filed suit. About nine months later the complaint
was dismissed, after notice to his then counsel, for failure to pros-
ecute. Two years later the appellee, by new counsel, moved to rein-
state the suit on the ground that his former counsel had been beset
with personal problems which involved the serious illness of his wife
and the recent death of his parents. Appellee was assured from
time to time by his former counsel that the case was proceeding
and that settlement would be made soon. Appellee learned that
his case had been dismissed for failure to prosecute only by check-
ing personally with the court clerk. The trial court granted the
motion to reinstate the suit and appellant appealed. Held, affirmed.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the action
under Rule 60(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which allows the court to vacate judgments for reasons justifying
relief from the operation of such judgments. The motion was made
within a reasonable time and the appellee, a person unfamiliar with
court procedures, should not be penalized by the inexcusable neg-
lect of his counsel. A dissenting judge reasoned that the motion
for reinstatement had not been made within a reasonable time and
19651
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